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he 1997 Texas Legislative Session focused heavily on tax issues,
and came far closer to massive property tax reform and a major
expansion of the franchise tax to non-corporate entities than many
observers had expected. In the end, the gap between the House plan to
adopt 3.5 billion dollars in new taxes to fund property tax relief and the
Senate plan to adopt 850 million dollars in new taxes to fund property tax
relief proved too great a chasm to bridge, and-in a decision that bene-
fited the Texas business community and the state's efforts to draw addi-
tional business to the state-the Legislature adopted a plan that provided
a billion dollars of property tax relief to Texans without changing the fun-
damental underpinnings of the franchise or sales tax.
I. SALES TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
Taxpayers enjoyed considerable success at the courthouse during the
Survey period, most notably with respect to cases focusing on manufac-
turing issues. In Texas Citrus Exchange v. Sharp a fruit juice manufac-
turer successfully challenged the Comptroller's assessment of sales tax on
the use of electricity to keep juice concentrate frozen until it was used to
make juice.' The issue the court faced was whether maintenance of the
juice concentrate at a constant frozen temperature was an exempt use of
electricity as part of the manufacturing process, or a taxable use of elec-
tricity for warehousing.2 Based on the definition of manufacturing, which
includes every operation from the first stage of production until the prop-
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1. 955 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet. h.). The Comptroller did not
challenge the exemption of the electricity used to freeze the concentrate, only the electric-
ity used to maintain the concentrate at below freezing temperatures. See id. at 166, 167.
2. Generally, electricity is exempt from sales tax unless it is used for commercial pur-
poses. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.317(a), (c)(2) (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998). Com-
mercial use is defined to include use in selling, warehousing, or distributing but does not
include the processing of tangible personal property for sale. See id. § 151.317(c)(2)(A)(i)
(Vernon Supp. 1998); see also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300(d)(1)(West 1997) (exempting
electricity used directly in the manufacturing process).
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erty is completed and packaged for sale, the court determined that "ware-
housing" refers to storage involving the final product, not incidental
storage that occurs during production of the product. Therefore, "only
electricity used to maintain or preserve completed property ready for sale
... constitutes a commercial use subject to taxation."'3 In holding that the
use of electricity to keep the concentrate frozen was an exempt part of
the manufacturing process, the court stated that the "Comptroller's un-
bending policy of exempting as noncommercial only electricity used to
change the physical characteristics of property" did not comport with the
statute or rules.4
Addressing a manufacturing issue currently being litigated in numerous
states, the court of appeals determined in Sharp v. Morton Buildings,
Inc.5 that manufactured components were distinct from their constituent
raw materials. The Comptroller assessed use tax on raw materials
purchased and manufactured outside the state into building components
that were subsequently brought into Texas and assembled into prefabri-
cated buildings.6 The court distinguished the building components from
their constituent raw materials and held that the raw materials were not
taxable because they were not used in Texas until after the materials had
been transformed into building components. Likewise, the building com-
ponents were not taxable because the taxpayer manufactured, rather than
purchased, the components. 7 Furthermore, the storage of the building
components at the job sites in Texas did not subject the taxpayer to use
tax on the storage. 8
3. Texas Citrus Exchange, 955 S.W.2d at 170; see 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300(a)(9)(West 1997); see also id. § 3.295(a)(7). The Tax Division argued that maintaining a concen-
trate at a frozen state cannot be exempt processing under rule 3.295 which excludes from
processing "any action taken to prolong the life of tangible personal property or to prevent
a deterioration of the tangible personal property being held for sale." Id.; see Texas Citrus
Exchange, 955 S.W.2d at 168-69.
4. Id. at 170. The court states "[m]anufacturing is a broader term that includes
processing; manufacturing need not always cause a change in the physical characteristics of
the property." Id.
5. 953 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
6. The state asserted that the taxpayer brought raw materials into the state that were
purchased for use in the state and the taxpayer's incorporation of the materials into the
purchaser's property was a consumption of the raw materials in Texas. See Morton Build-
ings, 953 S.W.2d at 302.
7. See id. at 303. Texas imposes a use tax "on the storage, use, or other consumption
in this state of a taxable item purchased from a retailer for storage, use, or other consump-
tion in this state." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.101(a) (Vernon 1992). The court noted
that use tax applies to items purchased out of state for use in Texas but does not apply to
items manufactured, rather than purchased, out of state. See Morton Buildings, 953
S.W.2d at 303. Further, the court noted that subsequent to manufacturing the building
components, the raw materials no longer exist and therefore could not be put to a taxable
use in Texas. See id.
8. See id. at 303-304. The court found that the stipulations of the parties indicated the
components were installed as expeditiously as possible after delivery at the jobsite. See id.
at 304; see also Bullock v. Shell Pipeline Corp., 671 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (storage tax not imposed on items brought into state and kept at jobsite no
longer than necessary for incorporation into construction project).
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In Sharp v. Cox Texas Publications, Inc., the court of appeals held that
Comptroller's Rule 3.299, which concerns publications, impermissibly im-
poses a sales tax on advertising, a nontaxable service. 9 The taxpayer pub-
lished a city visitors' magazine that was distributed without charge and
received revenue from advertisers who paid to have their advertisements
published in the magazine. According to the court, Rule 3.299 impermis-
sibly expanded the three-party sale concept set forth in Bullock v. Cordo-
van Corp.10 beyond the limited situation to which it applies, that is, when
advertisers pay a premium price to have the publisher distribute the free
magazine to a target audience." The publication at issue was not distrib-
uted to a targeted audience, and advertisers paid only the cost of ordinary
advertising services-they paid no premium. Therefore the Comptrol-
ler's assessment of tax on the taxpayer's entire advertising revenues was
the taxation of ordinary advertising services: a nontaxable service.' 2 Ad-
ditionally, the court held that the essence of the transaction between the
publisher and the advertisers was the sale of nontaxable advertising serv-
ices, rather than a taxable sale of the magazines.' 3
In Park 'N Fly of Texas, Inc. v. Sharp, the district court found Comp-
troller's Rule 3.315 concerning motor vehicle parking and storage to be
invalid and an unconstitutional retroactive law.' 4 The taxpayer provided
airport parking and shuttle transportation services. The Comptroller as-
sessed tax on the entire charge as a taxable parking service.' 5 The tax-
payer argued it was providing two services, one taxable and the other
non-taxable. The court held in favor of the taxpayer, finding that
Rule 3.315 unlawfully imposed sales tax on nontaxable transportation
services.
9. See 943 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ). Rule 3.299 requires
publishers of free magazines to collect sales tax from advertisers based on a fictitious sales
price of the magazine. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.299(b)(3)(A) (West 1997).
10. 697 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. See Cox Publications, 943 S.W.2d at 209; 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.299 (West
1997). In Cordovan, 697 S.W.2d at 436, the court of appeals held that a three-party sale
occurred justifying the imposition of sales tax on the distribution of a free magazine under
certain limited circumstances where advertisers paid a premium to have the publisher dis-
tribute the publications to specific industry groups. Sales tax on a three-party sale is assess-
able on the premium paid over and above the normal cost of the advertising services
provided. See id.
12. The court noted the difficulty of an assessment under Cordovan "when the Comp-
troller must deduct the ordinary cost of advertising to determine the amount of the pre-
mium on which to assess the tax," but stated that the present decision will limit the
circumstances in which that calculation will be necessary. Cox Publications, 943 S.W.2d at
210.
13. See id. The court held tax was due on the materials used in publishing the maga-
zine. See id. at 211.
14. See No. 95-12285 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Apr. 11, 1997) [hereinafter Park
'N Fly]; 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.315 (West 1997). Indeed, the court held that the Comp-
troller's taxation of the taxpayer's transportation services violated the taxpayer's rights to
equal protection and equal and uniform taxation under the United States and Texas consti-
tutions by failing to tax other, similar transportation services. See Park 'N Fly.
15. The Comptroller viewed the shuttle transportation costs as "transportation inci-
dent to the performance of a taxable [parking] service" and therefore included in the sales
price of the taxable service. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007(a)(4) (Vernon 1992).
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Although taxpayers may not have been as successful at the administra-
tive level as they were at the courthouse during the Survey period, the
Comptroller issued several interesting decisions (and a few surprising vic-
tories). In Decision 32,469 the Comptroller addressed the issue of when
sufficient contacts are present to establish nexus and impose sales and use
tax-collection responsibility. 16 An out-of-state corporation that sold toys,
gifts, and home decorating items through a network of home parties, con-
ducted with the assistance of a demonstrator, argued that its solicitation
activities were not sufficient to establish constitutional nexus under Quill
v. North Dakota.17 The administrative law judge held that the demon-
strators and hostesses were acting as representatives, agents, or salesper-
sons soliciting orders in Texas under the taxpayer's authority, thereby
obligating the taxpayer to collect the tax.18
In another decision examining the minimum level of contacts necessary
to establish nexus for sales- and use-tax collection, the Comptroller deter-
mined that an out-of-state company conducting seminars in Texas had
sufficient nexus to impose tax-collection responsibility on the company's
mail-order sales to Texas residents. 19 The administrative law judge re-
jected the company's argument that a business must maintain a perma-
nent location or representative in the state to establish nexus.20 The
company's in-state activities of conducting seminars, hiring faculty to
speak at the seminars, hiring temporary employees to act as coordinators,
and renting hotel space to conduct the seminars were sufficient to estab-
16. See Tex, Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,469, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 184 (May
21, 1997).
17. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). In Quill, the United States Supreme Court held that a mail
order vendor whose only connection with the taxing state was by common carrier or
United States mail had sufficient contact to establish nexus for due process, but insufficient
to establish nexus under the Commerce Clause, which requires physical presence in the
taxing state. See id. at 1906.
18. See 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 184, at *5; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.107(a)(2)
(Vernon 1992) (defining a retailer "engaged in business in this state" to include a retailer
with a "representative, agent, salesman, canvasser or solicitor operating in this state under
the authority of the retailer ... for the purpose of selling or delivering or the taking of
orders for a taxable item"); see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.103 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
The judge further determined that the goods were not purchased for resale, based in part
upon the relationship between the hostesses and the taxpayer as principal and agent, not as
seller and purchaser. See 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 184, at *19; see also Ltr. 9609L1438G12
(Sept. 18, 1996); But Where's the Food Court?, TAX POLICY NEWS, Feb. 1997, at 5 (adminis-
trator of electronic mall, as agent for its Texas client retailers, is responsible for collection
of sales taxes on transactions with client retailers' Texas customers); Ltr. 961127L (Nov. 8,
1996); Silence is Golden, TAX POLIcY NEWS, May 1997, at 4 (independent contractor estab-
lished nexus for out-of-state company by participating in speeches before associations and
clubs in Texas concerning the company's operations and services).
19. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 34,207, 34,944, 1996 WL 875037 (Dec.
11, 1996).
20. See id. at *6; National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization, 430
U.S. 551 (1977)(holding that an out-of-state seller's duty to collect use tax is established by
some minimum connection between the seller and the taxing state, and is not dependent




lish nexus with Texas. 21
In determining whether a taxable sale occurred, Decision 34,493 held
that a lessor's contribution or reimbursement for an item purchased by
the lessee is not a taxable transaction for the lessor.2 2 The administrative
law judge held that the taxability of the transaction rests solely between
the parties to the contract at issue, the lessee and the third-party vendor,
the lessor was not a party to the contract. In another decision, determin-
ing when a taxable use has occurred, the Tax Division argued that the
write-down of the value of a printing press that was purchased out of
state and stored in Texas while being held for resale was a taxable use. 23
The administrative law judge disagreed based on the fact that the tax-
payer did not depreciate the press for federal income tax purposes and
therefore the write-down did not constitute a taxable use since the tax-
payer did not enjoy a federal tax benefit from the write-down.2 4 Addi-
tionally, the storage of the press was exempt because the press was held
for resale. Although the taxpayer did not issue a resale certificate, the
exemption was allowed based on the taxpayer's evidence of intent to
resell.25
Several recent favorable decisions have been issued interpreting sales
and use tax exemptions.26 In Decisions 31,987 and 32,007, the Comptrol-
ler held that tangible personal property used in providing taxable services
may constitute a sale for resale without the customer taking actual physi-
cal possession.2 7 The taxpayer argued successfully that although actual
physical possession of the property had not transferred to the customer,
the customer's restrictions on the taxpayer's use of the property were so
21. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 34,207, 34,944, 1996 WL 875037 (Dec.
11, 1996) at *6; see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,952, 1997 WL 452226(Apr. 6, 1997) (Nexus was established by physical presence in the state through delivery of
merchandise in company trucks by taxpayer's personnel); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing
No. 34,536, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 306 (May 13, 1996) (similar facts and holding).
22. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,493, 1996 WL 875043 (Dec. 16, 1996);
see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,218, 1996 WL 875038 (Dec. 16, 1996).
23. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,937, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 9, at *10
(Jan. 10, 1997).
24. See id.
25. See id. at *11. Generally a sale of property for delivery in Texas is presumed to be
a sale for storage, use or consumption in Texas, and all gross receipts received by the seller
are presumed taxable, unless a resale certificate is accepted by the seller. See TEX. TAx
CODE ANN. § 151.104 (Vernon 1992), § 151.054 (Vernon 1992). The administrative lawjudge noted that these presumptions are concerned primarily with the seller, who can over-
come the presumption only by accepting a resale certificate from the buyer, but with re-
spect to a purchaser, the facts control the exemption availability, not the resale certificate.
See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,937, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 9, at *11 (Jan. 10,
1997).
26. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,451, 1996 WL 808006, at *5 (Dec.
2, 1996)(items purchased under a resale certificate for purposes of leasing to customers in
the normal course of business may qualify as operating assets for purposes of the occa-
sional sale exemption under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.304(b)(2) (Vernon 1992)).
27. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 31,987, 32,007, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 168
(Jan. 27, 1997); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.302(b) (Vernon 1992) (to qualify as a sale for




significant that the care, custody, and control had passed to the cus-
tomer.28 Decision 35,448 held that the availability of the manufacturing
exemption is not limited to the actual manufacturer; the use of third par-
ties to perform the actual manufacturing on behalf of the party claiming
the exemption is permitted.29 In determining that a women's clothing
wholesaler who contracted independent companies to perform the
processing of its garments qualified as a manufacturer, the administrative
law judge found it irrelevant whether the taxpayer's employees or its sub-
contractors performed the manufacturing activities. 30
As technology continues to advance, the multitude of Comptroller de-
cisions and taxability response letters evidence the challenge of the sales
and use tax laws to keep up with the rapid pace of technology. 31 Decision
33,164 addressed the taxability of services provided by a computer com-
munications company that operated a network of protocol processors
that provided interoperability among disparate computer devices by
changing the form of the data.32 The taxpayer objected to the assessment
of the services as taxable telecommunications services, arguing that its
customers were purchasing interoperability among its computers, not
point-to-point transmission or processing of information. 33 The adminis-
28. See Tex. Tax Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 31,987, 32,007, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS
168, at *10-11 (Jan. 27, 1997). The taxpayer's customer was the United States government
whose significant control was evidenced by the following factors: the government con-
trolled the actual purchase of the materials, title passed to the government upon delivery
to taxpayer, the government set the terms and conditions for use and storage of the prop-
erty, taxpayer was subject to an annual review, the government ensured the property was
maintained and the government insured the property. See id.
29. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,448, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 84, at *8
(Jan. 30, 1997); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
30. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,448, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 84, at *8
(Jan. 30, 1997); see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,524, 1995 WL 236046
(Apr. 3, 1995) (holding that tax was not due on materials used to repackage hospital kits
when the kits were subject to a sterilization process (considered manufacturing or process-
ing) performed by a third party).
31. Numerous Comptroller decisions and letters were issued during the Survey period
interpreting the taxation of various Internet services. See Ltr. 9609L1435G13 (Sept. 13,
1996); Internet Posting, TAX POLICY NEWS, Jan. 1997, at 5 (submission to owners of web-
sites and search engines of the name of and link to the customer's Internet sites is not a
taxable service); Ltr. 9610L1436A02 (Oct. 8, 1996) (Internet dating service is taxable infor-
mation service); Ltr. 9701189L (Jan. 23, 1997); Casting the Net, TAX POLICY NEWS, Aug.
1997, at 4 (construction of web sites is data processing service; sale of domain names is not
taxable); Ltr. 9703157L (Mar. 24, 1997); Cyber Representative, TAX POLICY NEWS, Apr.
1997, at 4 (Texas tax due on registration fee when shareware is registered for use in Texas);
Ltr. 9702163L (Feb. 25, 1997); Processing Data, TAX POLICY NEWS, Aug. 1997, at 4 (In-
ternet service providers cannot qualify for manufacturing exemption on equipment be-
cause such providers are not producing tangible personal property).
32. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,164, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 104 (Mar.
17, 1997).
33. Tax Code section 151.0103 defines telecommunications services as "the electronic
or electrical transmission, conveyance, routing, or reception of sounds, signals, data, or
information utilizing wires, cable, radio waves, microwaves, satellites, fiber optics, or any
other method now in existence or that may be devised, including but not limited to long-
distance telephone service." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0103 (Vernon Supp. 1998); see
also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.344 (West 1997) (further defining telecommunications serv-
ices). Numerous Comptroller decisions were issued during the Survey period addressing
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trative law judge found the services to be both protocol conversion and
the transmission of information between the parties and therefore
taxable.34
The Comptroller is continually presented with cases attempting to dis-
tinguish nontaxable software creation from the taxable sale of a computer
program.35 Decision 32,495 held that the exclusion from taxation for
software creation applies to software created from scratch, and the cus-
tomer must retain exclusive rights to the software. 36 Creation of a pro-
gram by using program strings ("recipes") was found to not qualify as the
development of a program from scratch.37 In an issue of first impression,
Decision 35,100 addressed when a computer program is modified in such
a way as to constitute the creation of a new program for sales tax pur-
poses. 38 The administrative law judge held that changing the code used
by the software was not sufficient to create a new program when the up-
graded version performs the same function as the old version and is still
covered by the same licensing agreement.39
Numerous cases during the Survey period reflect the continuous strug-
gle of both taxpayers and the Comptroller to clarify the distinction be-
tween nontaxable new construction and taxable repair and remodeling
services. In Decision 34,340 the Comptroller confirmed that extensive
construction in an existing building is not new construction if additional
the taxation of telecommunication services. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No.
32,730, 1996 WL 875036 (Dec. 11, 1996)(electronic transmission of one-way video broad-
casts of remote news coverage is taxable telecommunications service); Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,374, 1997 WL 186824, at *6 (Jan. 9, 1997)(voice mail service is
taxable telecommunications service); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,107, 1997
WL 452035, at *5 (Mar. 18, 1997)(directory assistance services are taxable telecommunica-
tions service).
34. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,164, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 104 at *13
(Mar. 17, 1997). The taxpayer argued its services were not data processing services be-
cause only the form of the information was changed, not the content of the information.
See id. The protocol conversion was held to be data processing, and the administrative law
judge noted that neither the Tax Code nor the rules distinguish between form and content
changes to information. See id. at *15.
35. See Ltr. 9707626L (Revised July 23, 1997); Electronic Answers, TAX POLICY NEWS,
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 8 (consultant's development of interactive software program for client
concerning application of state and local taxes to client's business was taxable sale of com-
puter program); Ltr. 9612054L (Dec. 3, 1996); Backup Computer, TAX POLICY NEWS, Apr.
1997, at 4 (computer backup services held taxable data processing service); see also Ltr.
9611839L (Nov. 5, 1996); Keep Those Phone Records, TAX POLIcY NEWS, Mar. 1997, at 3
(bill of lading, federal express receipt, postal receipt, or invoice with out of state shipping
address are acceptable proof of out of state sale. Sufficient proof for software sales sent to
out of state customers via modem include phone records or computer logs showing out of
state area code).
36. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,495, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 777, at *16
(Oct. 17, 1996); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0101(a)(5)(D) (Vernon 1992); 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.308(b)(4) (West 1997).
37. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,495, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS, at *16
(Oct. 17, 1996).
38. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,100, 1997 WL 450594 (July 23, 1997).
39. See id. at *5.
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footage is not added.40 In holding that the construction at issue was re-
modeling, the decision noted that although the construction was exten-
sive, involving the complete demolition of portions of the existing
improvement, the construction was all located within, (and was an inte-
gral part of) the existing building and resulted not in additional square
footage, but in a reallocation of the existing square footage. 41
Decision 33,034 held that the installation of a new system in existing
real property does not qualify as new construction. 42 A taxpayer who
installed a cable television system and monitors at various places in an
existing theme park argued that installation of the new cable system was
new construction because there was no existing cable system in the
park. 43 The administrative law judge disagreed with the taxpayer and
found the work was real property remodeling, explaining that, since the
theme park existed before the system was added, the cable system merely
upgraded or enhanced the park.44 Decision 34,706 recognized that when
replacing an existing system, usage of an improvement while work is in
progress should not be a factor disqualifying treatment as new construc-
tion.45 The replacement of a cable television system by taking the old
system out, suspending it to allow the old system to continue to provide
temporary service, building the new cable system underneath the existing
system, and then tearing down the old system was new construction. 46 In
40. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,340, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 62, at *5
(Feb. 18, 1997). The definition of new construction under rule 3.357 includes new improve-
ments to real property, including the initial finish out work to the interior or exterior of the
improvement and the addition of new footage to an existing structure. See 34 TEx. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.357(a)(5) (West 1997).
41. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,340, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 62, at *5, *8
(Feb. 18, 1997). The administrative law judge relied on Decision 34,112 which held that the
term "demolition" refers to the complete destruction of an improvement to realty and does
not encompass interior demolition or the demolition of a portion of a building. See Tex.
Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,112, 1995 WL 854656, at *2 (Jan. 1, 1996); see also Tex.
Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,748, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 144, at *6 (Feb. 24, 1997)
(finding that complete replacement of only the concrete portion of a race track that con-
sisted of both concrete and asphalt portions was not new construction because the work
did not result in a new complete structure or additional footage); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 34,530, 1996 WL 625196, at *3 (Oct. 31, 1996) (holding that taxpayer's use of
area, prior to finish out, for storage of building materials over multiple year period pre-
cluded later finish out of area from qualifying as new construction).
42. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,034, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 70, at *10-
11 (Jan. 24, 1997).
43. See id. at *10.
44. See id. at *10-11. This case also addressed services rendered for both demolition
(not a taxable service) and debris removal (a taxable service) for a single charge. The
administrative law judge held the entire charge was taxable real property services. See id.
at *15.
45. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,706, 1997 WL 404636, (Feb. 20,1997);
see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,764, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 390 (Jul. 10,
1996) (similar facts and holding). But see Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,491,
1997 WL 294517, at *7 (May 13, 1997) (rerouting of electrical and telephone cabling held
to be taxable real property remodeling).
46. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,706,1997 WL 404636, at *10 (Feb. 20,
1997). In fact, the administrative law judge notes that in Decision 28,489, allowing golfers
to use the cart paths on a particular hole prior to completion of the entire cart path system
"would not seem to be a legitimate basis for precluding a complete replacement of the
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addition, the judge held that overlashing new fiber optic cable alongside
an existing coaxial cable system so that the existing coaxial cable was left
in place and continued to transmit cable television signals to subscribers
while the fiber optic cable was added to provide new and different func-
tions qualified as new construction. 47
Decision 35,105 addressed whether an oral agreement to improve real
property was a lump-sum or a separated contract. 48 Pursuant to an un-
derstanding between the parties, the subcontractor was required to pro-
vide a written breakdown of the costs for materials and labor before a
purchase order would be issued. 49 Based upon the testimony and docu-
mentary evidence presented by the subcontractor, the administrative law
judge concluded that the "breakdowns" of the materials and labor were a
material part of the "contract" between the parties, and as such, the con-
tract was a separated contract.50
In an interesting decision, a taxpayer successfully challenged the comp-
troller's long-standing policy regarding exempt food. 51 The taxpayer pre-
pared sandwiches and cold food plates for sale to airlines who in turned
served the food to passengers during flight ("flight food"). 52 The Tax
Code sets forth a two-part test under which food is exempt unless the
food is served, prepared, or sold (1) ready for immediate consumption
and (2) in or by restaurants, lunch counters, cafeterias, vending machines,
hotels, or like places of business.5 3 The administrative law judge found
that the first part of the test for taxability was met: the flight food was
ready to be consumed immediately when sold.5 4 However, the flight food
course's cart path system from qualifying as new construction." Id. at *7; see Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 28,489, 1993 WL 35270, at *3 (Jan. 6, 1993) (holding that replace-
ment of only some of the cart paths on a golf course was remodeling).
47. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,706, 1997 WL 404636 at *10 (Feb. 20,
1997).
48. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,105, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 819 (Nov.
15, 1996); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291(a)(5), (6) (West 1997) (defining lump-sum con-
tract and separated contract).
49. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,105, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 819, at *5
(Nov. 15, 1996). The Tax Division argued that purchase orders and invoices should control
the characterization the contract since there was no formal written agreement. See id. at
*10.
50. See id. at *15. The judge noted that this decision should not have widespread ap-
plication because the subcontractor's success was due to his ability to prove that in the
numerous contracts between these specific parties, the requirement that material and labor
breakdowns be submitted was a recurring pattern that was a condition of the contract. See
id. at *16.
51. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,458, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 166 (Feb. 5,
1997).
52. In 1987 the Texas Legislature repealed the exemption for food and drinks
purchased by common carriers for service to passengers. See Act of July 21, 1987, 70th
Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 5, art. 1, pt. 4, § 23, sec. 151.314, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 8, 17 (repealing
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.314(d)). The parties in this decision agreed that the effect of
the repeal was that common carriers would be subject to the same statutes applicable to
other taxpayers.
53. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.314(a),(c) (Vernon 1992).




was not sold by a "like kind of business activity" to those businesses listed
in the statute, and therefore the second part of the test was not met, and
the flight food was not taxable.55 The judge found that the unambiguous
two-step statutory test controlled over the Comptroller's policy of disre-
garding the second-part of the test and assessing tax on all ready-to-eat
foods, regardless of where the food was served. 56
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Regular Session of the 75th Legislature began with sweeping pro-
posals to subject numerous additional services to tax to help fund prop-
erty tax relief, but the session ended with few substantive changes to the
Tax Code and numerous "cleanup" provisions to the sales and use tax
statues.
The definition of "sales price" or "receipts" was amended to require
that a trade-in must be of the type of property regularly sold by the seller
in order for the value of the trade-in to reduce the taxable sales price. 57
Therefore, tangible personal property taken in trade when the property is
not the type of property regularly sold by the seller will be included in the
taxable sales price. Further, a retailer is liable for sales tax on an item
purchased under a resale certificate if the purchaser uses the item as a
trade-in that reduces the amount of tax due on another taxable item.58
A new exemption was added for taxpayers working under contracts
with or on behalf of the United States or foreign governments to exempt
gas or electricity used in providing certain defense or national security-
related taxable items.59 Also concerning exempt entities, the Legislature
limited tax-free transactions to items sold for $5,000 or less for qualifying
religious, educational, charitable organization or tax-exempt organiza-
tions that are permitted to hold two one-day tax-free sales or auctions.60
In response to recent taxpayer victories at the courthouse, significant
changes were made to the manufacturing exemption to limit the exemp-
tion to property used directly in the manufacturing process and to require
a chemical or physical change in the product being manufactured or
processed for sale, or in an intermediate or preliminary product that be-
comes a part of the product manufactured for sale.61 In addition, the list
55. See id. at *37.
56. See id. at *39. The Comptroller has stated that rule 3.293 will be amended in ac-
cord with the decision in this case. See More Than Peanuts, TAX POLICY NEWS, Apr. 1997,
at 2.
57. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007(c)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
58. See id. § 151.154(f); see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,583, 1997 WL
294489 (May 18, 1997) (holding that trade-in must be separately identified by invoice, bill-
ing, sales slip or ticket, or contract).
59. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.317(c)(2)(A)(vi) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
60. See id. § 151.310(c). The same provisions were extended to one-day tax-free sales
by a student organization affiliated with an accredited Texas college or university. See id.
§ 151.321(a).
61. See id. § 151.318(a)(2); see also id. § 151.318(a)(4) (amendment exempting equip-
ment used to power, supply, support, or control exempt equipment directly used in the
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of items ineligible for the manufacturing exemption was expanded to spe-
cifically include (and thus make taxable) intraplant transportation equip-
ment used to move a product or material, including piping and conveyor
systems, as well as machinery and equipment or supplies used to maintain
or store tangible personal property.62 The manufacturing exemption was
further amended to provide that the taxpayer has the burden of proof
that the exemption is applicable and that no statutory exclusion applies.63
Each legislative session the Legislature continues to revise and refine
the application of sales and use tax to taxable services. 64 The Legislature
clarified that the exemption for services performed for use both within
and outside the state only applies to services that became taxable on or
after September 1, 1987.65
The staff-leasing rules were amended to exclude from taxation services
performed by assigned employees of a staff-leasing company for a client
under a written contract that provides for shared employment responsi-
bilities. 66 Exempt court reporting services were expanded to include
services by a video photographer who videotapes or films a deposition,
testimony, discovery document, or statement of fact prepared for use in
the suit.67
The exclusion from taxation of real property services purchased by a
contractor in connection with the construction of a new home were clari-
fied to include a speculative builder or developer within the term "con-
tractor. '68 A new provision was added to the exclusion from taxable
manufacturing process or that generates electricity, chilled water, or steam for sale);
§ 151.318(a)(5) (amendment exempting certain pollution control equipment).
62. See id. § 151.318(c)(1). The restrictions and exclusions added to section
151.318(a)(2),(c)(1) and (c)(5) do not apply to exempt semiconductor fabrication cle-
anrooms and equipment. See id. § 151.318(s). Piping which is part of a single item of
manufacturing or pollution control equipment may qualify for exemption. See id.
§ 151.318(c)(1). These amendments appear to be aimed at reversing the court decisions of
Sharp v. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 919 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied) and
Sharp v. Chevron Chemical Co., 924 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 50 SMU L. REV.
1479, 1480-81 (1997) [hereinafter Ohlenforst, 1997 Annual Survey] for a complete discus-
sion of these cases.
63. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(r) (Vernon Supp. 1998). Note that after Oc-
tober 1, 1997, there will be two subsections (r) under Tax Code § 151.318. The Legislature
added another provision, also designated as section 151.318(r), providing that computer
software manufacturing begins with the design and writing of the program and includes
testing or demonstration of the software. See id. § 151.318(r).
64. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0035 (Vernon Supp. 1998) (definition of data
processing amended to include a totalisator service (a service used by race tracks to pro-
cess wager information and calculate odds and pay-offs) and to exclude the transcription of
medical dictation).
65. See id. § 151.330(f). Services that became taxable on or after September 1, 1987,
include credit reporting, debt collection, insurance services, information services, real
property services, data processing, real property repair and remodeling, security services,
and telephone answering services. See id. § 151.0101 (Vernon 1992).
66. See id. § 151.057(3) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
67. See id. § 151.353(d). The Legislature provided that document preparation is a non-
taxable court reporting service if performed by a licensed court reporter or a notary public.
See id. § 151.353(a).
68. See id. § 151.0048(c).
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repair and remodeling for improvements that provide increased capacity
by producing additional products or services in a manufacturing produc-
tion unit of petrochemical refineries to clarify that a "new product" is not
a product derived from activities of straining or purifying an existing
product or from cosmetic changes.69
The taxation of prepaid telephone calling cards was changed by provid-
ing such sales will be taxed as the sale of tangible personal property and
not as a taxable service. 70 Retailers will be responsible for collecting and
remitting sales and use tax when the cards are sold.71
The Legislature amended the Local Government Code to authorize
voters in qualifying cities or counties to create sports or community venue
districts and to impose a local sales and use tax to build, renovate, oper-
ate, or maintain a stadium or other facility for sports or community
events, convention or civic center and related facilities, or any other eco-
nomic development project authorized by law.72
C. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
During the Survey period the Comptroller continued efforts to elimi-
nate and consolidate rules dealing with similar subject matter.73 Rules
concerning multistate tax credits and the allowance of credit for tax paid
to suppliers were consolidated, and the new rule clarifies that tax must be
recovered from the seller and a credit may not be given for tax paid to a
supplier for taxable items that are not resold but used for nontaxable
purposes.74 The Comptroller also consolidated rules concerning motor
69. See id. § 151.0047(b)(3).
70. See id. §§ 151.009, 151.0103. Prior to September 1 1997, telephone prepaid calling
cards were taxable telecommunications services. A seller could either include the tax in
the price of the card and remit the tax as the card was used, or collect and remit the sales
tax on the face value of the card at the time of sale. On or after September 1, 1997, sellers
will no longer owe the telecommunications infrastructure fund assessment on the sale re-
ceipts. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.1101 - 3.1103 (West 1997).
71. A new section 151.0132 was added to define "telephone prepaid calling card" and
specifically provide that the definition does not include calling cards sold through vending
machines for one dollar or less. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0132 (Vernon Supp.
1998).
72. See Act of May 20, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 551, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1929;
TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. chs. 334, 335 (Vernon Supp. 1998). The legislation also
allows voters to approve the imposition of other taxes, including an admissions tax, a tax
imposed on each motor vehicle in a parking facility of an approved venue project during an
event, a local hotel occupancy tax, a facility use tax on members of professional sports
teams, and a local sales tax on short term motor vehicle rentals. See id.
73. As a result of the consolidation process, numerous rules were repealed and new
consolidated rules were adopted bearing the same rule number as one of the rules included
in the consolidation. Therefore, although few substantive revisions were made during the
consolidation process, the reader is cautioned to examine closely any existing rules to en-
sure there has not been a change to such rule.
74. See 21 Tex. Reg. 9149 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 11505 (1996) (now codified at
34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.338). In addition, rule 3.338 was further amended to provide
that a purchaser may not claim a credit for tax paid on wrapping, packing, or packaging
materials used by a manufacturer to expedite or further the sale of tangible personal prop-
erty because such materials are not "resold" when the property is itself sold. See TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.338(c)(3)(B) (West 1997).
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vehicles and added a provision clarifying the Comptroller's policy of al-
lowing the sale for resale exemption for accessories and equipment at-
tached to motor vehicles that are held for sale, lease or rental.
75
Some rules were amended during the Survey period to reflect changes
made by the 1995 Legislature. Rule 3.294, concerning the rental and
lease of tangible personal property, was amended to reflect 1995 legisla-
tive changes exempting sales for resale in Mexico.76 The amendment al-
lows the issuance of a resale certificate for the purchase of property to be
held for lease within the United Mexican States and provides information
concerning the acceptance of valid resale certificates from Mexican
retailers. 77
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. LIABILITY FOR TAX-DOING BUSINESS IN TEXAS
In Sharp v. Hobart Corp.78 the taxpayer argued that it had no nexus or
minimum contacts with Texas for the 1990 tax period because, prior to
December 30, 1989, the taxpayer had stopped doing business in Texas,
transferred all of its assets and liabilities to a new corporation, and be-
come a holding company for the new corporation. The Comptroller ar-
gued that these facts were irrelevant because the company held a
certificate of authority to do business in Texas during the tax period and
therefore was subject to the tax. Although the appeals court was faced
with conflicting evidence, it concluded as had the trial court, that the tax-
payer had attempted to withdraw from the state before the tax period
began. (The taxpayer asserted that the state failed to grant the taxpayer's
application for withdrawal because of confusion created by the existence
of two corporations associated with taxpayer's name.) The court of ap-
peals therefore determined that the taxpayer had taken "affirmative acts
to sever its last semblance of a nexus with the State of Texas by withdraw-
ing its certificate of authority before the 1990 tax period began," so that
"the requisite nexus was absent and the imposition of the franchise tax
... violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution." 79
75. See 21 Tex. Reg. 9145 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 11497 (1996) (codified at 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.290).
76. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.006 (Vernon Supp. 1998), § 151.152 (Vernon 1992
& Supp. 1998).
77. See 22 Tex. Reg. 7505 (1997) (now codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.294). Provisions implementing 1995 legislative changes establishing when enter-
prise projects designated after August 31, 1995, may apply for sales and use tax refunds and
limiting the amount of refunds for such projects were added to rule 3.329. See 21 Tex. Reg.
9432 (1996), adopted 21 Tex. Reg. 11505 (1996) (now codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.329). Additionally, the amendment specifies that items eligible for refunds include
state tax on electricity and natural gas used in a business and on labor to refurbish build-
ings in an enterprise zone. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.329(c)(3)(C), (D).
78. 957 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet. h.). This case is included in this
Survey Article because the district court decision was issued during the Survey period;
however, after the Survey period, the court of appeals issued this opinion affirming the
trial court judgment.
79. Id. at 653.
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Several administrative decisions during the Survey period also focused
on whether taxpayers are subject to the franchise tax. In Decision
35,026,80 the taxpayer argued that it was subject only to the taxable capi-
tal component of the Texas franchise tax, on the ground that it did not
have "substantial nexus" with Texas sufficient to allow imposition of the
earned surplus component of the tax. The taxpayer, a wholesale distribu-
tor of houseware products, provided financing for its sales and entered
into agreements with distributors in Texas. Orders for the taxpayer's
products were sent to the taxpayer's Wisconsin headquarters. After dis-
cussing the taxpayer's various contacts with Texas, the administrative law
judge determined that the taxpayer's physical presence through its dis-
tributors in Texas "is more than that of just an out-of-state seller with no
connection to the state other than through the U.S. mail or by common
courier," and determined that the contacts were sufficient to impose the
franchise tax.81 Additionally, the Comptroller relied on an earlier deci-
sion, Decision 33,431,82 which determined that in-state solicitation by in-
dependent contractors constituted Texas nexus within the federal
constitution for sales and use tax purposes; the administrative law judge
concluded that the discussion in that decision also applied to franchise tax
context.
Wisconsin taxpayers were similarly unsuccessful in two cases involving
companies that plan and conduct professional seminars throughout Texas
and other states, selling materials and audio tapes related to its seminars.
Decision 34,83383 and consolidated Decisions 33,889 and 34,25584 each
involved taxpayers who argued that their activities in conducting semi-
nars did not constitute substantial nexus under the United States Consti-
tution, and asserted claims contesting the apportionment or calculation
methodology for the franchise tax. Decision 34,833 concluded that the
seminar activities did constitute nexus and were not protected under Pub-
lic Law 86-272,85 given the finding of the administrative law judge that
the taxpayer's activities related to conducting seminars were not ancillary
to the solicitation of orders for tangible goods. The administrative law
judge in Decisions 33,889 and 34,255 rested his decision in large part on
his conclusion that the taxpayer had entered into a contract with Texas
residents who accepted the offer to attend seminars in Texas and that,
80. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,026, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 185 (Apr. 24,
1997).
81. Id. This case discusses several United States constitutional issues, including the
taxpayer's Commerce Clause arguments, and discusses the Supreme Court's holding in
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Contrast this discussion with other deci-
sions issued during the year in which the Comptroller indicated that the administrative law
judge could not and would not consider constitutional arguments.
82. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,431 (March 7,1996), 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS
199.
83. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,833, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 183 (Apr. 18,
1997).
84. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 33,889, 34,255, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 138
(Mar. 21, 1997).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994).
[Vol. 511358
because the seminars were held in Texas and conducted by speakers hired
by the taxpayer, the taxpayer had performed its contracts in Texas and
provided services in Texas.86 As in most of the franchise tax administra-
tive decisions issued during the Survey period, the taxpayers in these
cases were unsuccessful across the board, also failing in their efforts to
contest the calculation methodology or to rely on Public Law 86,272 to
shield them from the tax.
In another administrative hearing, Decision 36,48587 the administrative
law judge refused to address the constitutional merits of the "exit tax"
provided for in section 171.0011 of the Tax Code.
88
B. CALCULATION AND ALLOCATION TO TAXABLE CAPITAL AND
EARNED SURPLUS
1. Additions to and Deductions from Surplus
Several taxpayers have contested the add-back to earned surplus of of-
ficer and director compensation required by the Tax Code;89 although
both district court judges and administrative law judges90 are currently
facing issues relating to the add-back, these issues have not yet been re-
solved. These cases address both multi-tiered corporations and the dis-
tinction between "real" officers and directors, and those individuals who
have "bare title" of officer or director, but do not have the corporate
authority characteristic of officers or directors.
Decision 26,54991 focused on a tax sharing agreement pursuant to
which a taxpayer and its parent corporation agreed to an allocation of tax
liability between the two companies. The parent would record an in-
tercompany tax receivable if the taxpayer owed it an amount pursuant to
the agreement, but recorded an intercompany tax liability if the taxpayer
recorded the receivable for its tax benefit. The taxpayer argued that its
intercompany tax receivable from its parent corporation should be ex-
cluded from surplus on the ground that the Comptroller did not allow the
parent corporation to reduce its surplus by the corresponding intercom-
pany tax payable. The taxpayer's argument was thus similar in numerous
86. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 33,889, 34,255, 1997 Tex. Tax. LEXIS 138(Mar. 21, 1997) (relying in part on 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.546(c)(1)(2)(A) (West 1997)).
87. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,485 (Apr. 7, 1997), 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS
40.
88. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0011 (Vernon Supp. 1998); see also Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,244, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 584 (Oct. 14, 1996) (holding that a dis-
solved foreign corporation was subject to the tax imposed pursuant to TEx. TAX CODE
ANN. § 171.0011(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998)); 3 Beall Brothers 3, Inc. v. Sharp, No. 97-05710
(Dist. Ct. of Travis County) (hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment on "exit tax"
set for May 14, 1998); B&A Marketing Co. v. Sharp, No. 97-01522 (Dist. Ct. of Travis
County)(pending case on whether taxpayer is subject to section 171.0011 surtax).
89. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
90. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,057, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 101
(Mar. 17, 1997) (focusing on a multi-tiered corporate group with an ultimate parent that
was a foreign corporation).




respects to the argument that the comptroller has used against taxpayers
in the operating lease cases (cases in which the Comptroller has argued
that a company may not deduct operating lease payments as debt, relying
in part on the fact that the offsetting asset is not reflected on the tax-
payer's books). The administrative law judge noted that the taxpayer's
most compelling argument was that the receivable and the payable
should be treated consistently. However, notwithstanding the consistency
argument (on which the Comptroller relies in the operating lease cases),
the administrative law judge in this case concluded that "the statute's def-
inition of debt overrides the Rule's requirement that these intercompany
tax accounts be reported in a consistent fashion," holding that "again, the
taxpayer loses. ''92
Decision 34,74093 focused on whether dividends coming from foreign
subsidiaries that did not transact substantial business or maintain a sub-
stantial portion of assets in the United States should be included in taxa-
ble earned surplus. The Tax Division argued that certain foreign dividend
gross-up income pursuant to section 78 of the Internal Revenue Code 94
and certain foreign dividend gross-up income under Internal Revenue
Code section 124895 that had been deferred by virtue of the federal con-
solidated return regulations until the 1993 franchise tax report year
should be included in surplus for that year. The Tax Division therefore
argued that the taxpayer should be required to include in federal taxable
income over eighteen million dollars of income from foreign subsidiary
corporations. The administrative law judge, after concluding that the Tax
Division was clearly erroneous in its assertion that the amount at issue
were foreign tax credits, concluded that, although the eighteen million
dollars might or might not have been reportable in 1984 had there been
an earned surplus tax in effect at the time, it could not be included in the
earned surplus calculations at a later date, particularly taking into ac-
count the "single entity reporting" intent of the franchise tax law.
In another decision that follows the "single entity" approach, Decision
36,03096 addressed the taxpayer's claim that it should be permitted to
take into account its business loss carryover from its amended 1995
franchise tax report. Relying on Comptroller Rule 3.555(g)(3), 97 which
provides that a corporation may not convey, assign, or transfer a business
loss to another entity, including by merger, the Comptroller concluded
that because the loss was originally incurred by a company that had
merged out of existence, no business loss deduction was available.
Numerous administrative decisions also focused on what amounts may
be deducted from surplus for franchise tax purposes, holding that taxpay-
92. Id.
93. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,740, 1997 WL 563404 (Jul. 21, 1997).
94. 26 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
95. Id. § 1248.





ers may not deduct various reserves and contingent obligations. 98
Decision 35,76399 addresses certain dismantling and removal costs for
improvements from oil and gas production sites and costs to restore the
sites in accordance with various binding agreements. The taxpayer
treated these amounts as debts, properly deductible from surplus. How-
ever, the administrative law judge concluded that "since the costs are for
future restoration, it is logical to conclude that such amounts are esti-
mated,"' 0° and that the amounts were not payable in an ascertainable
time period, so that they were not deductible. Although the taxpayer had
argued that the costs constituted contra-asset accounts for depletion, de-
preciation or amortization, which would have been excludable from sur-
plus under section 171.109(i)(2),101 the taxpayer failed to prove that these
amounts were properly a part of the contra-asset account for depletion,
depreciation or amortization.10 2
As always, several cases focused on what constitutes debt for franchise
tax purposes. Decision 30,826,103 for example, determined that the tax-
payer had failed to prove that a note was a uncollectible note or that
preferred stock was subject to a write-off for franchise tax purposes. An-
other decision that consolidated several different hearings determined
that a guarantor's obligation did not constitute intercompany debt.104
2. Allocating Gross Receipts
Several cases address the allocation of gross receipts as affected by the
throw-back rule. In Decision 34,757,105 the taxpayer argued that certain
of its sales receipts should not be thrown back to Texas because the tax-
98. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,931, 1997 WL 450568 (July 30, 1997);
(environmental reserves, including for superfund cleanup sites); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 35,519, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 49 (Mar. 26, 1997); (post-retirement medical
benefit (OPEB.)); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,504, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 150
(Feb. 4, 1997) (pension liabilities); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,625, 1997 Tex.
Tax LEXIS 80 (Feb. 3, 1997) (public liability and property damage accounts); Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,545, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 871 (Dec. 17, 1996) (dumping duty
deposits); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,078, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 888 (Nov. 26,
1996) (concluding that assets recorded in conformance with GAAP, even if contingent in
nature such as the taxpayer's deferred income accounts, are properly included in surplus
for franchise tax purposes).
99. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,763, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 857 (Nov. 22,
1996).
100. Id. at *6-7.
101. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.109(i)(2) (Vernon 1992).
102. Cf Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,897, 1998 WL 46298 (Dec. 19, 1997).
Although decided after the Survey period, this decision merits mention because of its hold-
ing that adjustments to a valuation impairment allowance of an oil and gas company could
be excluded from surplus, because the impairment allowance was, consistent with Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), included in the taxpayer's contra-asset ac-
count for depletion, depreciation and amortization.
103. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,826, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 38 (Mar. 24,
1997).
104. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 28,585, 31,612, 31,613, 31,614, 31,624, 31,938,
1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 889 (Dec. 11, 1996).
105. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,757 (Feb. 19, 1997), 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS
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payer had nexus in the destination states through its contract representa-
tives. This case is an interesting contrast to the nexus case discussed
earlier10 6 in that this judge decided that, despite the taxpayer's having
contracted to construct and deliver barges to Washington and Virginia,
the taxpayer's only contact with the destination states was that the barges
had been shipped there by another entity, so there was no taxing nexus
with the other states-meaning that receipts from these states should be
thrown back to Texas. The case is also noteworthy because it looks to the
nexus rule to be applied by the destination states at the time the vessels
were delivered rather than to the standards set forth under Texas law. 10 7
Another rare taxpayer win among the reported franchise tax cases dur-
ing the Survey period, Decision 34,052108 involved a taxpayer which as-
serted successfully that its delivery to oil and gas rigs located outside
Texas waters did not subject the receipts for these sales to the throwback
rule.10 9 The deliveries were outside the U.S. boundary, so the deliveries
were into an area that is neither a federal land nor federal waters; the Tax
Division nonetheless asserted that the sales receipts should be Texas re-
ceipts unless they were taxed by another state or delivered to a foreign
country. The administrative law judge, relying on Rule 3.549,110 con-
cluded that sales could be thrown back to Texas only if they were deliv-
ered to a purchaser "in another state," and that the locations at issue did
not constitute "another state."
Other cases addressing receipts include Decision 34,401,111 in which
the taxpayer was unable to convince the administrative law judge that
delivery of its sales were to Japan,1 12 and Decision 33,037113 in which the
administrative law judge determined that all receipts from inflight
magazines should be sourced to Texas, relying on a Comptroller rule that
treats all advertising revenue of a newspaper with its primary business
activities in Texas as Texas receipts. 114 The judge reached this decision
notwithstanding the taxpayer's arguments that newspapers and
magazines are fundamentally different and that its primary business activ-
106. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
107. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.554(f) (West 1997).
108. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,052, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 864 (Nov. 14,
1996).
109. The "throwback rule," found at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(1) (Vernon Supp.
1998) requires sales that are made to a state with which the taxpayer had no taxing jurisdic-
tion to be "thrown back" to Texas, in other words to be treated as Texas receipts for
franchise tax purposes.
110. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(e)(41)(I) (West 1997).
111. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,401, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 885 (Dec. 17,
1996).
112. The facts were somewhat complicated because the taxpayer acquired computers at
issue from its parent and made conflicting claims with respect to whether it or another
party had delivered the computers to the customer.
113. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,037, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 779 (Nov. 7,
1996).
114. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(e)(28) (West 1997).
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ities were not in Texas. 115 In Decision 35,982,116 the administrative law
judge held that receipts from repairs in Texas on equipment are appor-
tioned to Texas regardless of the ultimate shipment destination of the
merchandise being repaired.
Decision 35,520117 focused on the interpretation of the franchise tax
rule dealing with netting of gains and losses from capital assets118 and
held that the taxpayer was not allowed to deduct its net loss from certain
sales in Texas. The Comptroller also discussed (and dismissed) in a rela-
tively lengthy opinion the argument that the taxpayer should be permit-
ted to use less than a thirty-year life and zero salvage value for
depreciation of its distribution system." 9 The decision refers to several
prior Comptroller decisions addressing circumstances in which taxpayers
claimed a shorter amortization or depreciation period for assets than that
used on audited financial statements,120 and reviewed the parties' various
arguments concerning whether the proposed service life changes con-
formed to GAAP. 121
C. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The 1997 Legislative Session produced significant draft legislation, in-
cluding multiple versions of the key bill-House Bill 4-which began as
the Governor's tax bill, then took new form as the House adopted a com-
mittee substitute for the bill. 122 Although the Senate version of the draft
legislation differs in many respects from the House version, the Senate
carried the House version of franchise tax over into its own draft. How-
ever, several of the Senators most involved with drafting the tax language
indicated their intent to use the Conference Committee version as a vehi-
cle for further modifications to the franchise draft.
123
Among the conceptual problems the bill created were the mechanics of
the tax on partnerships. As drafted, the committee substitute for House
Bill 4 would have required some-but not all-partners' compensation to
be added to the tax base.124 Such legislation would have effectively im-
115. The judge also dismissed taxpayer arguments concerning whether the receipts re-
sulted from the sale of service, while focusing on whether the sale should be characterized
as a sale of an intangible, of tangible personal property, or of a service.
116. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,982, 1997 Tex. Tax. LEXIS 247 (July 1,
1997).
117. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,520, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 828 (Nov. 12,
1996).
118. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(e)(3) (West 1997).
119. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,738, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 798 (Oct.
21, 1996).
120. See, e.g., id. at *11-14 (referencing Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 30,118
(May 4, 1995)).
121. See id. at *9-20.
122. See Tex. H.B. 4, 75th Leg., R.S. § 315 (1997).
123. See id.
124. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON TAX REFORM AND PUBLIC SCHOOL FIN., BILL
ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 4, 75th Leg., R.S., § 315 (1997) (proposed amendment to TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 171.110(a)(i)(E)).
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posed an income tax on the tax of some partners (e.g., lawyers, account-
ants, or other professionals holding a 0.1% or greater partnership
interest) while allowing other similarly-employed partners to pay no
tax.125 Thus, for example, five accountants with equal partnership inter-
ests would effectively pay tax on 4.5% of their income, but partners of a
Big Six firm would not pay the tax.
The franchise tax amendments the Legislature adopted were far less
dramatic. Some were merely conforming changes to update references to
the Internal Revenue Code, 126 and others were what the Comptroller la-
beled a clarification of existing law. 127
One of the few potentially significant franchise tax amendments ad-
dresses the allocation of gross receipts from patents, copyrights, trade-
marks, franchises; or licenses in Texas. 12 As amended, section
171.103(4) provides explicitly that receipts from these sources are allo-
cated to Texas, based on their use in Texas.' 2 9 (The Legislature indicated
that it viewed this provision as "a clarification of existing law.' 130) The
Legislature also adopted a corresponding change to section 171.1032,131
which applies to taxable earned surplus.
The Legislature "clarified" section 171.109 by providing that consoli-
dated reporting "of surplus" (rather than "the surplus of related corpora-
tions") is prohibited. 132 Similarly, the Legislature added a new
subsection to section 171.110 to "clarify" that a corporation shall report
its net taxable earned surplus based solely on its own financial condition,
and that "[c]onsolidated reporting is prohibited.' 1 33 The Legislature also
amended similar no-consolidation language to sections 171.112134 and171.1121.135
A new section 171.212136 requires a corporation to file an amended
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998) (as
amended to refer to Internal Revenue Code as in effect for federal tax years beginning on
or after January 1, 1996, and before January 1, 1997); Franchise Tax, TAX POLICY NEWS,
July, 1997, at 5.
127. See id., e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(b)(3)(C) (Vernon Supp. 1998) (ad-
ding "banking corporation" to the list of entities included in the term "corporation"); See
also id. § 171.002(d).
128. See id. § 171.103.
129. Id. § 171.103(4).
130. Act of May 30, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1185, § 16(2) sec. 171.103(5), 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 4569, 4573. See Franchise Tax supra note 126. The Legislature discussed, and
considered seriously, repealing the long-established "location of payor" rule for interest
and dividends, but-to the benefit of Texas-based businesses and the Texas economy-
retained the rule as it applies to interest and dividends.
131. See Act of May 30, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1185, §§ 6 & 16(3); sec.
171.1032(2)(5), 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4569, 4570, 4573.
132. See id. §§ 8 & 16(5), sec. 171.109(d), at 4570, 4573.
133. Id. § 16(6) & 9, sec. 171.110, at 4571, 4573; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.110(h)
(Vernon Supp. 1998). (Note that unlike section 171.109, this provision says only "consoli-
dated reporting," without further elaboration).
134. Id. § 171.112(d) (gross receipts for taxable capital).
135. Id. § 171.1121(c) (gross receipts for taxable earned surplus).
136. Id. § 171.212.
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franchise tax report if the corporation's net taxable earned surplus is
changed as the result of an Internal Revenue Service ("or another com-
petent authority") 137 audit or adjustment, or if "the corporation files an
amended federal income tax return or other return that changes the cor-
poration's net taxable earned surplus."'1 38 Although prior law had a
mechanism for amending franchise returns following certain "final deter-
mination[s]" by federal agencies, 139 this provision imposes a broader re-
quirement to file amended franchise tax returns and, in the view of some
Comptroller representatives, is (together with amendments to section
111.206), the first indication that an Internal Revenue Service audit quali-
fies as an investigation by a federal agency. 140 The penalty for failure to
file the amended report is a penalty of ten percent of the tax that should
have been, but was not previously, reported to the Comptroller.
141
In other changes, the Legislature provided that the section 171.102 pro-
vision addressing taxable capital of a liquidating corporation applies only
to the computation of taxable capital under section 17.101;142 amended
the law concerning apportionment of taxable capital and earned surplus
for certain entities selling management, administration or investment
services to an employee retirement plan;143 and changed the require-
ments for getting a extension of time to file an annual report.
144
The Legislature also amended certain provisions dealing with exempt
non-profit corporations 145 and added section 171.1016, dealing with "de-
fense readjustment projects."'1 46 The new section 171.1016 provides that
a corporation that has been designated as a defense readjustment project
under the Government Code may deduct fifty percent of its capital in-
vestment in the aggregate from its apportioned taxable capital, or deduct
five percent from its apportioned taxable earned surplus.147
D. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
The Comptroller adopted or amended several regulations during the
Survey period to reflect amendments to the Tax Code made by the 1995
137. Id. § 171.212(a)(1).
138. Id. § 171.212(a)(2).
139. Id. 111.206 (Vernon 1992).
140. This section is likely to create confusion not only as to deadlines (and determining
when "all administrative appeals" have been exhausted), but also as to the statute of limi-
tations. See infra notes 273-288 and accompanying text.
141. See TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 171.212(d) (Vernon Supp. 1998). Note that the pen-
alty does not include the amount of the underreported tax. See id.
142. Id. § 171.102 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
143. See id. § 171.106(d)-(g) (Vernon Supp. 1998). In a provision that indicates the na-
ture of the legislative process, section 171.106(g) provides that if another act of the 75th
Legislature's Regular Session makes the same substantive changes, but differs in text, the
cited version prevails regardless of enactment dates. See id. § 171.106(g).
144. See id. § 171.202 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998).
145. See id. § 171.063.




Legislature. For example, Rule 3.541,148 a new rule effective December
10, 1996,149 reflects the Comptroller's changes with respect to franchise
tax exemptions. This rule also conforms the definition of corporations
that qualify for franchise tax exemption with the Comptroller's policy. 150
The Comptroller also proposed, but did not adopt an amendment to
Rule 3.545.151 to conform with 1997 legislative changes concerning exten-
sion payments made by taxpayers requesting an extension for the time in
which to file an annual franchise tax report.
In December 1997, the Comptroller circulated three draft franchise tax
rules: Rule 3.549 (taxable capital: apportionment), 152 Rule 3.556 (earned
surplus: S corporations), 153 and Rule 3.562 (limited liability compa-
nies), 154 to reflect changes made by the 1997 Legislature. Changes to
Rule 3.549 include a provision to reflect the legislative statement that rev-
enues from trademarks, franchises, and licenses for reports due on or af-
ter January 1, 1998, are "included in Texas receipts to the extent used in
Texas; 1 55 and to provide that if "services are performed inside and
outside Texas, [the] receipts are Texas receipts on the basis of the fair
value of the services rendered in Texas. ' 156 In December 1997, the
Comptroller also proposed amendments to Rule 3.556 concerning the
earned surplus of S corporations;1 57 these changes deal primarily with
computation for a qualified subchapter S subsidiary. 158
Interestingly, the Comptroller did not amend Rule 3.557 (earned sur-
plus apportionment)159 although a draft version of the rule has been cir-
culating since mid-1996 that would reflect the Comptroller's change of
policies as a result of the Pennzoil Co. v. Sharp160 decision and other
changes in agency policy, particularly concerning receipts from trusts and
partnerships.
The Comptroller has also considered amending Rule 3.558, which deals
with officer and director compensation as included in earned surplus
148. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.541 (West 1997).
149. See 21 TEX. REG. 2202 (1996) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.541). The
Comptroller also adopted the repeal of the rules formerly codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 3.541, 3.542, and 3.573 concerning exemptions.
150. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.541(c) (West 1997).
151. See 22 Tex. Reg. 10249 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.545) (proposed Oct. 17,
1997).
152. See 22 Tex. Reg. 12702 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549) (proposed Dec. 26,
1997).
153. See 22 Tex. Reg. 12703 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.556) (proposed Dec. 26,
1997).
154. See 22 Tex. Reg. 12703 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562) (proposed Dec. 26,
1997).
155. 22 Tex. Reg. 12702 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(e)(30)(A)(iii)) (pro-
posed Dec. 26, 1997). But see supra note 136, and accompanying text, referring to change
as a clarification).
156. Id. § 3.549(e)(38).
157. See 22 Tex. Reg. 12703 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.556) (proposed Dec. 26,
1997).
158. See id.
159. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557 (West 1997).
160. See No. 94-00974 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Mar. 3, 1995).
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computation.' 6 ' A draft version of the rule provides that officer and di-
rector compensation does not include any amount reported to an officer/
director which is disallowed as a reduction to federal taxable income for
any taxable period for federal income tax purposes. 162 As noted earlier,
several cases are pending with respect to the constitutionality of the com-
pensation add-back, and it is possible that the next Survey period may see
a policy or judicial modification of the officer and director add-back.
The Comptroller also proposed an amendment to Rule 3.562, concern-
ing limited liability companies 63 to reflect additional changes enacted by
the 1997 Legislature, as well as to acknowledge the "check the box" regu-
lations issued by the Internal Revenue Service.164 The proposed
franchise tax amendments reflect Comptroller policy on the computation
of reportable federal taxable income for limited liability companies that
are treated as sole proprietorships, divisions or branches of corporations,
or corporations. For example, the rule provides that a single member of a
limited liability company which is treated as a divisional branch of a cor-
poration for federal tax purposes, will compute its "reportable federal
taxable income" for franchise tax purposes as though the limited liability
company were a separate corporation for federal income tax purposes. 16
5
Thus, a single member limited liability company that is treated as a corpo-
rate division or branch for federal income tax purposes will compute its
reportable federal taxable income for franchise tax purposes in the same
manner as a limited liability company that is treated as a corporation for
federal tax purposes. 166
Proposed changes to Rule 3.568167 would add a new subsection to pro-
vide that an "entity that was subject to franchise tax prior to conversion
and that continues to be subject to franchise tax after conversion will not
have a new beginning date for franchise tax;" and to make other changes
to acknowledge the possibility of conversion from one entity to
another.168
The Comptroller also drafted proposed or adopted amendments to sev-
eral other rules.169
161. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.558 (West 1997).
162. Draft rule circulated Oct. 27, 1997.
163. See 22 Tex. Reg. 12705 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562) (proposed Dec. 26,
1997).
164. See TREAS. REG. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 1997).
165. See 22 Tex. Reg. 12705 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562(g) (proposed Dec.
26, 1997).
166. See id. § 3.562(h).
167. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.568 (West 1997).
168. 22 Tex. Reg. 12707 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.568) (proposed Dec. 26,
1997). See also TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.18 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
169. See e.g., 22 Tex. Reg. 12704 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.561 (proposed Dec.
26, 1997); Draft 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 5.573 (provisional exemptions); 22 Tex. Reg.
10250 (1997) (34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.575 (proposed Oct. 17, 1997); (annual extensions





A. APPLICATION OF TAX/EXEMPTIONS
During the Survey period, Texas courts continued to struggle in defin-
ing the circumstances under which goods involved in international com-
merce are taxable. In a five-four decision, the Texas Supreme Court held
in Vinmar, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District170 that the imposition
of property taxes on goods brought into Texas and which were awaiting
export was unconstitutional because the tax violated the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.1 71 Vinmar's business was to
purchase plastic resin for foreign customers and to export the resin to the
customer's country, and its practice was to obtain orders and then seek to
locate the goods necessary to fill the order.172 Once goods were
purchased, they were shipped to a Houston warehouse and remained
there to await finalization of import clearance, currency control proce-
dures and letters of credit. 173 Vinmar's profit margin was small, and ap-
parently the imposition of the property tax would render Vinmar's
transactions profitless. 174 The Supreme Court ruled that the property tax
on Vinmar's goods failed the requirement in the Commerce Clause that
the tax must not prevent the federal government from speaking with one
voice in its regulation of commercial relations with foreign govern-
ments,175 relying on the conclusion in other cases that property taxes as-
sessed against goods awaiting export under similar circumstances violated
the one-voice prong of the Import-Export Clause of the United States
Constitution, which is the same test employed under the Commerce
Clause. 176
This case appears to further narrow circumstances in which property
taxes may be imposed on properties destined for foreign locations.
Although the Supreme Court concluded that the facts of Vinmar are simi-
lar to those in Virginia Indonesia Co. v. Harris County Appraisal Dis-
trict,177 there are some important differences that would have made it
easier for a court to conclude that property tax could be imposed on
Vinmar when it could not be imposed on Virginia Indonesia. These dif-
170. 947 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1997).
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In Complete Auto Trans Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 279-87 (1977), the United States Supreme Court set forth four factors used to evaluate
whether a state tax complies with the Commerce Clause. In order for the state tax to be
valid, a tax must: (i) apply to an activity having a substantial nexis with taxing state; (ii) be
fairly apportioned; (iii) not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (iv) be fairly
related to the services provided by the state. See id. If the taxes are on foreign commerce,
in addition to the criteria set forth above, the tax must not (1) create a substantial risk of
international multiple taxation or (2) prevent the federal government from speaking with
one voice in its regulation of commercial relations with foreign governments. See Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).
172. See Vinmar, 947 S.W.2d at 554.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 556 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 555.
176. See id.
177. 910 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2523 (1996).
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ferences include that Vinmar's principal place of business was in Harris
County, whereas Virginia Indonesia had no place of business in Texas;
that Vinmar held the goods in Texas until payment was made, which gen-
erally was a lengthy period, whereas Virginia Indonesia's goods usually
remained in Texas for no more than forty-five days; and that Vinmar
purchased goods to fill orders for customers whereas Virginia Indonesia
never bought goods from which to supply its principal and was merely
reimbursed for its costs (at no profit to Virginia Indonesia). 78 The dis-
sent forcefully concludes that if Vinmar's property cannot be taxed, it is
difficult to envision how any exporter's goods can be taxed.
179
In Deer Park v. Harris County Appraisal District, °80 it was held that the
federal statute granting a property tax exemption for tangible personal
property imported from outside the United States into a foreign trade
zone for specified purposes and for property held in the foreign trade
zone for exportation does not violate the United States Constitution.'
8
'
In this case, three school districts sued companies in foreign trade zones
for property taxes that would be due but for the federal foreign trade
zone exemption, claiming that the exemption unconstitutionally intruded
on their authority as components of the federal system of divided power
and extended unconstitutionally national authority over foreign trade.'
82
In rejecting the school districts' claims, the court reasoned that the fed-
eral government had exercised its constitutional authority in the facts at
hand over international commerce in a manner complying within the lim-
its of its power and the limit on federal intrusion on the states' partial
autonomy.'8 3 Indeed, tax exemptions have long been a tool used by the
federal government to build a national economy.
8 4
There were two important cases during the Survey period addressing
the constitutionality of methods of valuation prescribed in the Tax Code.
The Austin Court of Appeals held in Travis Central Appraisal District v.
FM Properties Operating Co.18 5 that section 23.12(a) of the Tax Code, 86
which requires that certain residential real property held for sale in the
ordinary course of a trade or business be treated as inventory and valued
178. See Vinmar, 947 S.W.2d at 557-58 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 559.
180. 963 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
181. See id. at 609. The foreign trade zone exemption provides that the following tangi-
ble personal property is exempt from property tax:
property imported from outside the United States and held in a zone for the
purpose of storage, sale, exhibition, repackaging, assembly, distribution, sort-
ing, grading, cleaning, mixing, display, manufacturing, or processing, and tan-
gible personal property produced in the United States and held in a zone for
exportation, either in its original form or as altered by any of the . . .
processes [described above].
See 19 U.S.C. § 81o(e) (1994).
182. See Deer Park, 963 F. Supp. at 605.
183. See id. at 609.
184. See id. at 608.
185. 947 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, n.w.h.).
186. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.12(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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as a single unit,187 does not violate the Texas Constitution. 8 8 The ap-
praisal district argued that the valuation method violated the requirement
in the Texas Constitution that taxation be equal and uniform and that
property be taxed in proportion to its value, 189 and that nothing in the
Texas Constitution created a property tax exemption for residential real
property inventory.190 The court reasoned that the valuation method did
not violate the equal and uniform requirement because the valuation
method mandated by the Texas Legislature was not unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious given that the method was supported by generally ac-
cepted appraisal techniques. 191 The court also rejected the appraisal
district's claim that section 23.12(a) prevented property from being taxed
in proportion to its value.' 92 This requirement merely means that as-
sessed valuations must be based on reasonable cash market value, and
section 23.12(a) prescribes a method of valuation that produces a reason-
able estimate of market value. 193 As the Texas Supreme Court concluded
in Enron Corp. v. Spring Independent School District,194 a statute fixing a
valuation method does not create a tax exemption;195 therefore, the ap-
praisal district's position that section 23.12(a) created a constitutionally
impermissible exemption is wrong.196
In another case in which an appraisal district challenged the constitu-
tionality of a method of valuation set forth in the Tax Code, the Houston
[14th Dist.] Court of Appeals held in Tex-Air Helicopters, Inc. v. Ap-
praisal Review Board of Galveston County, Texas,' 97 that section 21.05 of
the Tax Code, 198 which sets forth the method appraisal districts must em-
ploy in allocating to Texas the portion of the value of commercial aircraft
used in interstate commerce, is constitutional. 199 Section 21.05(2) pro-
vides that if a commercial aircraft is used both in and outside of Texas,
the appraisal district is required to allocate to Texas the portion of the
187. See id.
188. See FM Properties, 947 S.W.2d at 735.
189. See id. at 728-33. The appraisal district's primary position was that section 23.12(a)
violated the "equal and uniform" requirement of article VIII, section 1(a) of the Texas
Constitution by treating some owners of real property, i.e., those whose property is inven-
tory, differently from other owners of real property. See id. at 728; TEX. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1(a). By valuing the property as a single unit as opposed to valuing each parcel sepa-
rately, a lower value per acre will generally result because under the development ap-
proach, the appraiser will subtract from the gross retail value of the lots development costs,
opportunity costs, and other expenses. See FM Properties, 947 S.W.2d at 729. In valuing a
single unit of inventory as opposed to individual lots, the retail price at which the individ-
ual lots are sold is only one of several factors to be considered. See id.
190. See id. at 734.
191. See id. at 732.
192. See id. at 734.
193. See id.
194. 922 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1996).
195. See id. at 940-41.
196. See FM Properties, 947 S.W.2d at 735.
197. 940 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ granted).
198. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.05 (Vernon 1992).
199. See Tex-Air Helicopters, 940 S.W.2d at 303.
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value of the aircraft that fairly reflects its use in Texas.200 The appraisal
district asserted that the statute is effectively an exemption which is not
permitted by the Texas Constitution, 20 1 and relied on Aransas County
Appraisal Review Board v. Texas Gulf Shrimp Co. 20 2 in which the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals held that section 21.03,203 a very similar statute
to section 21.05, is an unconstitutional exemption. 2° 4 Section 21.03(a)
provides that if personal property is used continually outside Texas, then
the appraisal district must allocate to Texas the portion of the value of the
property that fairly reflects its use Texas.20 5 In concluding that section
21.03(a) is unconstitutional, the court in Aransas reasoned that section
21.03(a) did not require that the portion of the value of the property not
allocated to Texas be taxed elsewhere, thus effectively creating an exemp-
tion.20 6 The Houston Court of Appeals in Tex-Air, however, rejected the
rationale in Aransas, instead following two more recent cases in which
courts concluded that similar statutes were constitutional because they
provided a method of determining taxable value rather than granting an
exemption. 20 7
In Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Harris County Appraisal District20 8 the
Houston First District Court of Appeals interpreted the terms of a tax
abatement agreement. The agreement was entered into in 1988, and pro-
vided that the tax abatement would be effective on the January 1 date
immediately following the date the agreement was executed. 20 9 The
agreement further provided that the abatement would not exceed five
years. 210 Quantum delayed the commencement of construction until
1990 and claimed an abatement for 1994, arguing that it was entitled to a
five-year abatement which should not have started until after construc-
tion commenced.21' The court disagreed, reasoning that the agreement
was clear in providing that the abatement started in 1989 and that its
200. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.05(2) (Vernon 1992).
201. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a) (amended 1995).
202. 707 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
203. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.03 (Vernon 1992).
204. See Aransas County, 707 S.W.2d at 188, 196.
205. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.03(a).
206. See Aransas County, 907 S.W.2d at 189-91. The appraisal district also argued that
section 21.05 is not a valuation statute because it is not placed in chapter 23 of the Tax
Code, which is entitled "Appraisals Methods and Procedures." However, the court re-
jected this argument, concluding that if section 21.05 were intended to be an exemption, it
would be included in chapter 11 of the Tax Code, "Taxable Property and Exemptions." See
Tex-Air Helicopter, 940 S.W.2d at 303.
207. See id. at 302-03. The two cases followed by the court in Tex-Air Helicopter are
Tarrant Appraisal District v. Colonial Country Club, 767 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1989, writ denied), and Enron Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931
(Tex. 1996).
208. See 962 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 1, 1997, n.w.h.) (motion
for rehearing granted).
209. See id. at 51.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 51-52.
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maximum five-year term would end after the 1993 tax year.212
B. PROCEDURE
In Henderson County Appraisal District v. HL Farm Corp.213 the East-
land Court of Appeals declined to follow a Houston Fourteenth District
Court of Appeals decision concerning whether a taxpayer which is in liti-
gation concerning a property tax issue for a particular year is required to
exhaust its administrative remedies before amending the lawsuit to in-
clude later years in the lawsuit. 214 In the case, the taxpayer was in litiga-
tion with the appraisal district for the 1988 tax year concerning the
constitutionality of section 23.56(3) of the Tax Code, 215 which denied
open-space land designation to foreign entities.216 In 1993, the Texas
Supreme Court held in another case that section 23.56(3) was unconstitu-
tional.217 Thereafter, the taxpayer amended its petition to include tax
years 1989 through 1993 in the litigation.218 However, the taxpayer had
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies for years 1990, 1991, and
1993.219 The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief for years
1990, 1991, and 1993 because the taxpayer had not exhausted its adminis-
trative remedies for those years. 220 The court stated that the decision by
the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Harris County Ap-
praisal District v. Bradford Realty, Ltd. ,221 was in error. In a very similar
situation, the court held in Bradford that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies for the year initially included in the lawsuit, together with the
amendment of the petition to include later years, were sufficient to put
the appraisal district on notice, and thus the taxpayer did not have to
repeat the administrative and protest process for the later tax years. 222
The Henderson County court further concluded that the Texas Supreme
Court's decision that section 23.56(3) is unconstitutional should be ap-
plied retroactively, thereby allowing the taxpayer a recovery for the years
212. See id. This case makes it clear that the abatement agreement for any abatement
intended to begin later than the year following the year in which the agreement is executed
must clearly and expressly provide when the abatement is to begin. For example, it is
common for abatements to begin in the first year after which a certificate of occupancy
with respect to the facility is issued.
213. 956 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, no writ).
214. See id. at 674.
215. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.56(3) (Vernon 1992).
216. See id.
217. See HL Farm Corp. v. Self, 877 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1994).
218. See Henderson County, 956 S.W.2d at 674.
219. See id. at 674, 675.
220. See id. at 675.
221. 919 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
222. See id. at 134. The Henderson County court further concluded the Texas Supreme
Court decision that section 23.56(3) is unconstitutional should be applied retroactively,
thereby allowing the taxpayer a recovery for the years in the litigation in which it had
exhausted its administrative remedies. Henderson County, 877 S.W.2d at 675. The court
based its conclusion on its belief that the retroactive application of the Self decision would
not produce inequitable results. See id.
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in the litigation in which it had exhausted its administrative remedies.2 23
In Harris County Appraisal District v. Duncan,224 the Houston Four-
teenth District Court of Appeals addressed the calculation of the ap-
praisal ratio of a taxpayer's property for purposes of determining whether
the taxpayer was entitled to relief for unequal appraisal. Pursuant to sec-
tion 41.41(a)(2) of the Tax Code,225 a property owner may protest an "un-
equal appraisal" of his property as compared to other properties in the
district.226 The property owner will prevail unless the appraisal district
can establish that the ratio of his property's appraised value to his prop-
erty's market value (the appraisal ratio) is not greater than the median
level of appraisal of a sample of other properties in the district.227 If the
property owner is dissatisfied with the appraisal review board's determi-
nation on the "unequal appraisal" issue, then he may appeal to the dis-
trict court.22 8 However, the district court may grant relief only if it
determines that the appraisal ratio of the property at issue exceeds the
median level of appraisal by ten percent or more. 229 The issue in Duncan
was the calculation of the property owner's appraisal ratio. The median
level of appraisal for the district was 92.45% (i.e., the average property's
appraised value equaled 92.45% of its market value). 230 Therefore, the
appraisal ratio of the property owner's property needed to be equal to or
in excess of 102.45% in order for the property owner to prevail under the
"unequal appraisal" argument. In determining the appraisal ratio of the
property owner's property, the district court used the original appraised
value asserted by the appraisal district as the numerator rather than the
appraised value as determined after the protest hearing by the appraisal
review board.23 1 Based on the original appraised value, the appraisal ra-
tio of the subject property exceeded the median level of appraisal by
more than ten percent.232 Had the value determined by the appraisal
review board been used, however, the appraisal ratio of the subject prop-
erty would not have exceeded the median level of appraisal by more than
ten percent. 233 The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court, relying
largely on section 1.12(b) of the Tax Code,234 which provides that the
appraised value used in the appraisal ratio is that "determined by the
223. See id.
224. 944 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
225. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.41(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
226. Id.
227. See id. § 41.43.
228. See id. § 42.01 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
229. See id. § 42.26(a) (Vernon 1992). The ten percent threshold applies only to "une-
qual appraisal" issues addressed by the district court, and does not apply at the appraisal
review board level. Compare TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.43 (Vernon Supp. 1998) with id.
§ 42.26(a) (Vernon 1992).
230. See Duncan, 944 S.W.2d at 707.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 709.
234. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.12(b) (Vernon 1992).
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appraisal office or appraisal review board, as applicable .... ",235 The
court reasoned that if a court were precluded from using the value deter-
mined by the appraisal review board in circumstances such as this one in
which the appraisal review board had agreed that the market value of the
property was lower than the original value determined by the appraisal
district, then the words "or appraisal review board, as applicable," would
be meaningless because the value determined by the appraisal review
board would never be used.2 36
In Sweetwater Independent School District v. ReCor, Inc.,237 the East-
land Court of Appeals held that property owned by a county and used for
public purposes is exempt even though the exemption was not timely
urged during the appraisal review proceedings.2 38 Although section 42.09
of the Tax Code 239 provides that a property owner may not raise an ex-
emption in a defense to enforce collection of delinquent taxes unless the
ground was raised during the appraisal process,240 the court reasoned that
this statutory provision does not bar the exemption granted political sub-
divisions under article XI, section 9 of the Texas Constitution, 241 which
provides that property owned by counties and held for public purposes is
exempt from taxation.242 Thus, the exemption is automatic. 243
C. LEGISLATION
Although the focus of the 1997 Texas Legislature was squarely on the
subject of revamping Texas' system of school finance, the effort died in
Conference Committee. However, the Texas Legislature did pass many
significant property tax bills during its 1997 term. Many of these bills
created new exemptions; others modified existing exemptions. The Texas
Constitution was amended to increase the school district homestead ex-
235. Id.; see Duncan, 944 S.W.2d at 708.
236. Id. The taxpayer also argued that the trial court cannot consider the appraisal
review board's findings of a lower appraised value under the de novo standard of review
that applies to property tax trials at district court. See id. at 709. Section 42.23 of the Tax
Code provides that review by the district court of property tax matters is by trial de novo.
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.23 (Vernon 1992). The court rejected this argument, rely-
ing on section 1.12 of the Tax Code, which provides that the district court is required to use
the revised appraisal review board value of the property at issue in calculating the ap-
praisal ratio. See Duncan, 944 F.2d at 709.
237. 955 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, pet. filed).
238. See id. at 704.
239. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1992).
240. See id. § 42.09(a).
241. See TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
242. See id.
243. See Sweetwater, 955 S.W.2d at 704. In another decision involving the property tax
exemption for government-owned property used for a public purpose, the Attorney Gen-
eral ruled that a court could reasonably conclude that a state-owned university would be
entitled to the public purpose exemption on property used temporarily as a public family
entertainment center. The university was in the process of converting the use of the prop-
erty to a public purpose use, that being educational activities. Indeed, some of those activi-
ties were already taking place. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-429 (1996).
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emption from $5,000 to $15,000.244 Amended section 23.23 of the Tax
Code provides that the appraised value of a residence homestead may not
increase more than ten percent per year (plus the value of all new im-
provements).2 45 Section 11.13(h) was amended to provide that a person
may not receive a residence homestead, over-65 or disability exemption
for more than one residence homestead in the same year. 246 Section
11.42(c) was amended to provide that the cemetery, charitable organiza-
tion, youth development association, religious organization, school, dis-
abled veteran and the nonprofit water supply corporation exemption, and
certain other miscellaneous exemptions set forth in section 11.23, are now
effective immediately upon these entities' acquisition of eligible prop-
erty.2 47 The charitable organization exemption was expanded to provide
that qualifying charitable organizations are exempt if they provide hous-
ing and related services to individuals who are age sixty-two and older in
a retirement community if the community provides independent living
services, assisted living services and nursing services without regard to
ability to pay if certain other conditions are met.248
There were also several important procedural changes relating to pro-
tests and appeals to district court. One of the most important changes is
that section 41.43 of the Tax Code was amended to provide that in a pro-
test concerning market value or unequal appraisal, the appraisal district
has the burden of proof.249 Section 42.08(b) was amended to make more
244. See TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b(c) (amended 1997). This exemption is imple-
mented by an amendment to section 11.13(b) of the Tax Code. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 11.13(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998). Texas voters also approved an amendment to the Texas
Constitution to allow the Texas Legislature to enact a law allowing the transfer of all or
part of the over-65 property tax freeze to another homestead. See TEx. CONST. art. VIII,
§§ 1-b(c), (d).
245. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998). This amendment was
made possible by an amendment to the Texas Constitution that allows the Texas Legisla-
ture to limit annual increases in the appraised value of residence homesteads for property
tax purposes to ten percent or a greater percentage for each year since the most recent tax
appraisal. See TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(i).
246. See TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.13(h) (Vernon Supp. 1998). The over-65 and disa-
bility exemption provide that in addition to the residence homestead exemption, an adult
who is disabled or is age 65 or older is entitled to an exemption from school district prop-
erty taxes of $10,000 of the appraisal value of his residence homestead. See id. § 11.13(c)
(Vernon 1992). In addition, if approved by the voters of the taxing unit, an individual who
is disabled or age 65 or older is entitled to an additional property tax exemption. See id.
§ 11.13(d) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
247. See id. § 11.42(c). Prior to this amendment, the exemption was applicable effective
for the next preceding year following such entities' acquisition of the relevant property.
248. See id. § 11.18(d)(19).
249. See id. § 41.43. This change in burden of proof will almost certainly make it more
likely for a taxpayer to protest based on unequal appraisal, given that the appraisal district
will required to at least establish a prima facia case of there not being unequal appraisal
with respect to the property at issue. The legislation also provides that before a hearing on
a protest or immediately after the hearing begins, the appraisal district and the property
owner or its agent are required to provide the other with a copy of any written material
that the person intends to offer and submit to the appraisal review board at the hearing.
See id. § 41.45(h). However, if the information is provided immediately after the hearing




straightforward the amount a taxpayer is required to pay to taxing juris-
dictions in order to preserve its right to appeal, and now provides that
taxpayers are required to pay the lesser of the amount of taxes due on the
portion of the taxable value of the property in dispute or the amount of
taxes due on the property under the order being appealed.2 50 Section
42.08(c) was amended to provide that the maximum award for the tax-
payer's attorneys fees in a property tax controversy is $100,000.251 Sec-
tion 42.06 was amended to eliminate the requirement that certain
property owners desiring to file suit challenging an appraisal review
board decision are required to file a notice of appeal. 252
Section 6.025 of the Tax Code was amended to provide that if a prop-
erty lies within the boundaries of more than one appraisal district, and if
those appraisal districts have not reached an agreement by May 1 of the
relevant year concerning the appraised value of the property, then the
appraised value of the property in each such appraisal district shall be the
mean of the appraisal districts' asserted values.253 In addition, the owner
of property lying within the boundaries of more than one appraisal dis-
trict is entitled to file a protest concerning the property in any of such
appraisal districts, and the appraisal review board or court's determina-
tion on the issue protested is binding on all such appraisal districts.254
The legislation further provides that if a residence is subject to the juris-
diction of more than one appraisal district, then the granting of a resi-
dence homestead exemption or an over-65 or disability exemption by one
such appraisal district is binding on the other appraisal districts.2 55
Section 33.01 was amended to provide that penalties and interest ac-
crue at the rates provided in the Tax Code even after a judgment has
been entered into.256 Section 33.01 was also amended to provide harsh
250. See id. § 42.08(b). Prior to this amendment, the property owner was required to
pay (i) the amount of taxes due on the portion of the taxable value of the property that is
not in dispute or the amount the taxes imposed on the property in the preceding year,
whichever is greater, or (ii) the amount of taxes due on the property under the appraisal
review board order. See id. § 42.08(b) (amended 1997).
251. See id. § 42.08(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
252. See id. § 42.06. Under prior law, failure to file a notice of appeal when required
was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a lawsuit; however, any property owner who failed
to deliver a timely notice of appeal in a circumstance in which it was required to pay a
penalty to each taxing unit in which the property is taxable in an amount equal to five
percent of the taxes finally determined to be due on the property.
253. See id. § 6.025(e).
254. Id. § 6.025(f). This provision appears to give the property owners a distinct advan-
tage in circumstances in which property lies within the boundaries of one or more appraisal
district and the appraisal districts differ concerning the value of the property. For example,
if Blackacre lies within both Appraisal District X and Appraisal District Y, and Appraisal
District X believes the property is worth $100 and Appraisal District Y believes the prop-
erty is worth $200, it seems axiomatic that the taxpayer would file its protest in Appraisal
District X, which would have little reason to dispute any value over $100. In other words,
query who will be doing the lobbying on behalf of Appraisal District Y in the protest filed
with Appraisal Review Board with jurisdiction under Appraisal District X.
255. See id. § 6.025(d).
256. See id. § 33.01(a). In addition, a delinquent tax continues to accrue interest as long
as the tax remains unpaid, irrespective of whether a judgment for the delinquent taxes has
been rendered. See id. § 33.01(c).
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penalties to property owners who improperly received the residence
homestead exemption, the over-65 exemption and the disability exemp-
tion in certain circumstances. 257 The penalty is fifty percent of the
amount of tax.2 58 New section 33.065 enables individuals to defer a delin-
quent tax suit on the portion of the debt which exceeds the sum of 105%
of the property's value for the prior year plus the value of all new im-
provements to the property.259 Once deferred, a taxing unit may not sue
to collect until the individual no longer owner and occupies the property
as a residence homestead.260
Section 33.52 of the Tax Code was amended by House Bill 2587261 (and
also by House Bill 3306)262 to make the consequences of failing to pay
property taxes even more onerous. Prior law provided that if there is a
foreclosure sale of real property, the judgment shall provide, on the mo-
tion of the taxing unit, that the taxing unit recover from the sale proceeds
the property taxes on the property for the current year, prorated to the
day of judgment. 263 Pursuant to House Bill 2587, the law has been
changed to enable taxing units to recover the current year's taxes in full
(i.e., not prorated).264 However, House Bill 2622 amended section 33.52
to provide that the taxing unit may recover from the proceeds of the fore-
closure sale taxes for the year of sale prorated to the date of sale.
265
Thus, it is unclear what portion of the current year's taxes on property
sold at a foreclosure sale a taxing unit may recover from the proceeds of
the foreclosure sale.
In legislation that creates an expensive trap for the unwary, section
5.010 of the Property Code was added to provide that, subject to certain
exceptions, a seller of vacant land must include in the sales contract spe-
cific statutory language notifying the buyer that if the land qualifies for
special appraisal for property tax purposes, the buyer may not qualify for
special appraisal and may owe rollback taxes on the property.26 6 The
consequence of the seller's failure to include the statutory language in the
contract is fairly draconian-essentially, the seller becomes liable for the
payment of rollback taxes on the property if the rollback taxes are trig-
gered before the fifth anniversary of the date of the transfer of the
257. See id. § 33.01(d).
258. See id.
259. See id. § 33.065(a).
260. See id. § 33.065(c).
261. See Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1111, § 3, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4246.
262. See Act of May 23, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 906, § 8, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2854, 2855.
263. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.52(a) (amended 1997).
264. See Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1111, § 3, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4246.
265. See Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 981, § 2, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3051, 3052.




Section 23.121 of the Tax Code, which provides specific rules concern-
ing the valuation for property tax purposes of inventory held by motor
vehicle dealers, was amended to expand the definition of the term "motor
vehicle dealer" to include businesses recognized as motor vehicle dealers
under the laws of another state.268 New sections 23.127 and 23.128 were
added to provide that the inventory of manufactured home retailers shall
be determined pursuant to procedures very similar to those used for mo-
tor vehicle dealers,269 and new sections 23.1241 and 23.1242 were added
to provide that essentially the same procedures apply to dealers of heavy
equipment.270
Several important amendments were made to section 25.25, which ad-
dresses the correction of appraisal rolls. 271 Section 25.25(1) was added to
provide that a motion to correct the appraisal roll under section 25.25(c)
(correction for clerical errors, multiple appraisals of the same property,
or inclusion of property that did not exist in the form or at the location
described in the roll) may be filed irrespective of whether the property
owner protested the value of the property that is the subject of the mo-
tion. 272 In addition, a party bringing a motion under section 25.25(c) or
(d) is entitled to a hearing and determination thereon if the chief ap-
praiser and the property owner have not reached an agreement with re-
spect to the proposed correction within fifteen days after the date the
motion is filed.273
IV. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS AND PERSONAL LIABILITY
A. JURISDIcTION
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the failure to
raise a constitutional challenge at the administrative level is a bar to juris-
diction of the district court and held the constitutional challenge was
within the trial court's jurisdiction.274 In Central Power and Light v.
267. See id. § 5.010(e). The statute appears to even allow the purchaser to recover
rollback taxes for years after the date of sale in which property receives special valuation
as long as the change in use occurred before the fifth anniversary of the date of transfer.
This seems especially unfair, given that the purchaser enjoyed the benefits of the special
valuation during years after transfer.
268. See id. § 23.121. The Department of Transportation was also given the power to
initiate termination proceedings with respect to motor vehicle dealers failing to file the
declaration required by section 23.121 of the Tax Code, or which had fewer than five sales
in the prior year. See id.
269. See id. §§ 23.127, 23.128.
270. See id. §§ 23.1241, 23.1242.
271. See id. § 25.25.
272. See id. § 25.25(1).
273. See id. § 25.25(e). Hearings on motions under sections 25.25(c) and (d) are now
expressly required to be conducted in the same manner as appraisal review board hearings
under chapter 41 of the Tax Code. See id. § 25.25(m).
274. See Central Power and Light Co. v. Sharp, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 443, 1997 WL 126855
(Mar. 21, 1997) (per curiam).
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Sharp2 75 the taxpayer sought to bring a constitutional challenge to a Tax
Code provision in the district court, without having raised the constitu-
tional issue at the administrative level in its motion for rehearing. The
Comptroller argued that failure to raise the constitutional issue at the
administrative level precluded raising the issue for the first time at the
trial court, based on the limitation set forth in Tax Code section
112.1252(a) restricting the issues that may be raised in a suit seeking a tax
refund to the grounds of error contained in the motion for rehearing of
the administrative case. 276 The Court noted that this statutory limitation
implicitly assumes that the agency has the authority to decide the issues
presented in the motion for rehearing.2 77 It is well settled that the agency
lacks the authority to decide constitutional challenges, therefore the
Court found that failure to raise the constitutional issue at the administra-
tive level did not preclude jurisdiction of the trial court.278
B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The court of appeals reviewed the statute of limitations applicable to
taxpayers seeking a refund of sales and use tax based on vendor assign-
ments and held that refund claims may be barred by the statute of limita-
tions where the Comptroller and the vendors have not entered into a
waiver of the statute. 279 In Fleming Foods v. Sharp,280 the taxpayer and
the Comptroller entered into an agreement extending the time period for
the taxpayer to file tax refund claims. The Comptroller denied the re-
funds which were outside the original limitations period, reasoning that
the original statute of limitations was not extended without a waiver
agreement between the Comptroller and the vendors. 28' The taxpayer
argued that an assignee, attorney or successor of any person who paid the
taxes has standing to file a refund claim under the Tax Code.2 8 2 Under
the court's analysis, the Tax Code provision that authorizes a refund must
be read in conjunction with the provision that allows agreements to ex-
tend the limitations period applicable to refunds, and the term "taxpayer"
as used in each of these statues refers to the same person-the person
who paid the tax directly to the state.28 3 Therefore, the court held that
275. See id.
276. See id. at *1; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.152(a) (Vernon 1992).
277. See Central Power and Light, 1997 WL 126855, at *1.
278. See id. at *21; Birdville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. First Baptist Church, 788 S.W.2d 26(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied); Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Walgreen Tex.
Co., 520 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
279. See Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Sharp, 951 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex. App.-Austin
1997, writ requested).
280. See id.
281. See id. at 280. Generally the statute of limitations for refund claims under Tax
Code section 111.104 is four years. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 111.104(c); 111.107;
111.207 (Vernon 1992).
282. See Fleming Foods, 951 S.W.2d at 281; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.104 (Vernon
1992).
283. See Fleming Foods, 951 S.W.2d at 282; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.104 (Vernon
1992) (refund provisions); id. § 111.203 (agreements to extend period of limitations).
1998] 1379
SMU LAW REVIEW
the failure of the vendors to enter into extension agreements with the
Comptroller precluded the taxpayer's refund requests from being timely
filed.284
In another case released on the same date as Fleming Foods, the court
of appeals similarly upheld the denial of refund claims, based on assign-
ments of refunds obtained from the vendors, as being barred by the stat-
ute of limitations.285 In S&H Marketing Group, Inc. v. Sharp the
taxpayer challenged the constitutionality of Tax Code section 111.104 and
Rule 3.325 as a violation of state and federal due process and equal pro-
tection guarantees. 286 The taxpayer argued that an unconstitutional dis-
parity of treatment among taxpayers existed by allowing taxpayers who
directly pay taxes to the state to seek a refund directly from the Comp-
troller and requiring taxpayers who pay taxes to the seller of goods and
services to seek a refund from the seller, rather than the Comptroller.2 87
The court held that taxpayers were not treated differently and that,
through the vendor assignment provisions, refunds may be sought di-
rectly from the Comptroller by both categories of taxpayers.2 88 The tax-
payer also argued that the statute of limitations was tolled due to the
taxpayer's reliance on incorrect advice received from the Comptroller's
office.289 Generally, unauthorized or negligent acts of an official or agent
will not estop a governmental unit exercising its public or governmental
functions.2 90 The court held that the Comptroller's collection of taxes
was a governmental function and therefore the statue of limitations was
not tolled due to incorrect information from the Comptroller's office and
the Comptroller was not estopped from asserting a defense based on the
statute of limitations. 291
C. BURDEN OF PROOF
Numerous Comptroller decisions during the Survey period examined
the requisite burden of proof with respect to taxable services. Decision
32,141 summarized the Tax Division's burden as requiring prima facie
proof that the service at issue is a taxable service enumerated in the Tax
284. See Fleming Foods, 951 S.W.2d at 282.
285. See S&H Marketing Group, Inc. v. Sharp, 951 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Austin,
1997, n.w.h.).
286. See S&H Marketing, 1951 S.W.2d at 267; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.104 (Vernon
1992); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.325 (West 1997).
287. See S&H Markets, 951 S.W.2d at 264.
288. See id. The court cited its holding in Fleming Foods that both taxpayers who pay
the tax directly to the state, and those who obtain a refund request and an assignment of
refund rights from the taxpayer who remitted the tax directly to the state, have standing to
file a refund claim under Tax Code section 111.104. See Fleming Foods, 951 S.W.2d at 282.
289. See S&H Marketing, 951 S.W.2d at 266.
290. See id. The taxpayer argued that an exception to the general rule applies where
equity and justice require estoppel. The court responded that the exception created in City
of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1970), was not applicable in the present case
because the exception is limited to municipalities. See S&H Marketing, 951 S.W.2d at 266.
291. See id. at 267.
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Code and that the service was purchased or sold tax free. 292 If the Tax
Division presents sufficient proof, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Tax Division is wrong,
or to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the service is exempt
from taxation. If the taxpayer alleges the service is not taxable because it
is within an exclusion (rather than an exemption), and there is no indica-
tion that inadequate records are available to determine whether the ex-
clusion applies, the burden is on the Tax Division to establish, on its face,
not only that the service in question is included among the type enumer-
ated in the statute, but also that the service is not the type intended to be
excluded. 293
D. PERSONAL LIABILITY
Several administrative decisions were issued during the Survey period
applying the guidelines regarding assessment of personal liability set forth
in a series of related comptroller decisions issued in 1996.294 In Decisions
32,467 and 32,468 the administrative law judge found that, under the
guidelines, to carry its prima facie burden of proof for imposing personal
liability with respect to an accrual basis corporate taxpayer, the Tax Divi-
sion must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that an actual amount
of taxes were collected and not remitted, and that the office or director
exercised sufficient financial control over the corporation to properly re-
mit the taxes or divert them from other purposes.295 The decision held
that the Tax Division failed to prove that the day-to-day manager and
majority stockholder, or the president and majority stockholder, both
with sufficient financial control over the corporation, were personally lia-
ble because the Tax Division failed to show how much, if any, sales tax
was actually collected but not remitted.296 The Comptroller also ad-
dressed numerous cases of taxpayers seeking penalty waivers.297
292. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,141, 1996 WL 875034, at *5 (Dec. 11,
1996); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0101 (Vernon 1992); see also Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 33,539, 1996 WL 875033 (Dec. 9, 1996) (holding that Tax Division
failed to prove a taxable service was sold by failing to present evidence describing the type
of work performed by the taxpayer).
293. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,141, 1996 WL 875034, at *4-*5 (Dec.
11, 1996); see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 32,354, 1997 WL 450692 (Mar. 3,
1997) (setting forth Tax Division's burden of proof when exclusionary issue raised). In a
related decision, Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,645, 1997 WL 617900 (Sept. 9,
1997), the administrative law judge held that the taxpayer's evidence of statutory exclusion
that was submitted in the taxpayer's exceptions to the administrative law judge's proposed
decision was sufficient to satisfy the taxpayer's burden by a preponderance of the evidence.
294. See Ohlenforst, 1997 Annual Survey supra note 62, at 1509-11. This article con-
tains a complete discussion of the guidelines enumerated in these cases.
295. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing Nos. 32,467, 32,468, 1997 WL 294544, at *2
(June 1, 1997).
296. See id. at *3; see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,098, 1996 WL 661132
(Oct. 2, 1996) (personal liability not established against president and majority shareholder
with financial control over corporate funds based on Tax Division's failure to prove knowl-
edge that taxes were collected but not remitted).
297. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,714, 1996 Tex. Tax LEXIS 849 (Dec.
11, 1996) (holding that reliance on a Big Six accounting firm was not a factor to be consid-
1998] 1381
SMU LAW REVIEW
E. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
The Legislature expanded the fifty percent penalty imposed on the fail-
ure to pay the tax or file a report due to fraud or intent to evade the tax
to apply to a taxpayer who alters, destroys, or conceals items or otherwise
engages in fraudulent conduct for the apparent purpose of affecting the
course or outcome of an audit, investigation, redetermination or other
proceeding before the Comptroller.298 Additionally, Tax Code section
111.206, providing an exception to the statute of limitations for final de-
terminations resulting from an administrative proceeding of a local, state,
or federal regulatory agency, was amended to specifically provide that an
"administrative proceeding" includes an audit by the Internal Revenue
Service.299
The Comptroller amended Rule 1.39 to allow the dismissal of a case in
which specific grounds for relief have not been raised or in which the only
grounds raised cannot be ruled upon at the administrative level, for ex-
ample, the constitutionality of a statute. 300
V. CONCLUSION
The 1997 legislative session proved that significant tax reform may one
day become a reality. A special House committee has been appointed
and asked to prepare recommended changes for consideration by the
House when it meets again in January, 1999. Until the Legislature meets
again, Texas tax law will continue to develop at the courthouse and
through the administrative process.
ered in determining whether taxpayer exercised reasonable diligence to comply with the
tax laws); see also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,773, 1997 Tex. Tax LEXIS 108
(Mar. 17, 1997) (granting partial penalty waiver because franchise tax issue giving rise to
the imposition of the penalty involved a difficult and complex area of law that caused
confusion to many taxpayers).
298. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.061(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
299. See id. § 111.206 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1998). In 1995 the Legislature amended
Tax Code section 111.206 to provide that the term "federal regulatory agency" includes the
Internal Revenue Service. See id.
300. See 22 Tex. Reg. 4565 (1997), adopted 22 Tex. Reg. 7059 (now codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.39).
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